Active Directory Security Assessment & Attack Path Hardening: The 2026 Enterprise Field Guide
The field-tested enterprise manual for auditing and hardening Microsoft Active Directory environments against modern adversary tradecraft. Covers Kerberoasting mitigation, DCSync privilege restriction, GPO abuse prevention, Tier-0 asset isolation, BloodHound attack path eradication, and continuous event logging for CERT-In & RBI compliance.
Interactive Technical Checklist (12 Verification Checkpoints)
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[Tiering & Architecture] Enforce administrative tiering model separating Tier 0 (DCs, PKI), Tier 1 (Enterprise Servers), and Tier 2 (Endpoints).Mandate: RBI Master Direction PAM
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[Tiering & Architecture] Configure 'Deny Log on Locally' and 'Deny Remote Desktop Services' for Domain Admins on all Tier 1/2 systems.Mandate: Credential Theft Defense
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[Kerberos & SPN Defense] Identify all Service Principal Names (SPNs) associated with user accounts and migrate to Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA).Mandate: Kerberoasting Prevention
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[Kerberos & SPN Defense] Disable DES and RC4 Kerberos cipher suites domain-wide; enforce AES-128 and AES-256 for Ticket Granting Tickets (TGT).Mandate: Cryptographic Hardening
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[Delegation & DCSync] Audit Domain object ACLs; remove 'Replicating Directory Changes' rights from non-DC accounts.Mandate: DCSync Mitigation
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[Delegation & DCSync] Disable Unconstrained Delegation on all computer accounts except Domain Controllers; migrate to Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD).Mandate: Token Abuse Mitigation
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[GPO & Scripts Hardening] Verify SYSVOL and Netlogon share permissions; remove any GPO containing plaintext cPassword credentials.Mandate: Privilege Escalation Defense
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[GPO & Scripts Hardening] Restrict Write/Modify permissions on Group Policy Objects to Domain Admins and dedicated GPO Creator Owners.Mandate: GPO Tamper Prevention
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[NTLM & Legacy Protocols] Audit and disable NTLMv1 domain-wide; enforce SMB Signing and LDAP Channel Binding/Signing on all DCs.Mandate: Relay Attack Defense
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[NTLM & Legacy Protocols] Implement Protected Users security group for all privileged operators to disable NTLM, DES/RC4, and credential caching.Mandate: LSASS Dumping Defense
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[SOC Telemetry & Auditing] Configure Advanced Audit Policy to capture Event IDs 4662 (Directory Object Access), 4768/4769 (Kerberos Requests), and 4728 (Group Changes).Mandate: CERT-In 180-Day Log Mandate
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[SOC Telemetry & Auditing] Deploy active canary service accounts (honeytokens) to trigger immediate SOC alerts upon any Kerberos ticket request.Mandate: Threat Deception & Response
In over 90% of enterprise breaches in the BFSI and IT sectors, initial endpoint compromise escalates to total domain takeover within hours via misconfigured Active Directory trust paths, unconstrained delegation, and stale service account credentials. This field guide outlines actionable controls to sever these attack paths.
1. The 3-Tier Enterprise Administration Model
Credential theft via LSASS injection (Mimikatz) succeeds when domain administrators use their credentials to log into lower-security workstations or application servers. The Microsoft Tier Model enforces cryptographic and policy boundaries:
2. Critical Kerberos & SPN Attack Vectors
| Attack Vector | Adversary Mechanism | Remediation Control |
|---|---|---|
| Kerberoasting | Requests TGS tickets for SPN accounts and cracks RC4/AES hashes offline using Hashcat. | Migrate to Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA); use ≥ 25-character random passwords; enforce AES-256. |
| AS-REP Roasting | Targets user accounts where "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" is flagged. | Run LDAP query for userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=4194304 and re-enable pre-auth. |
| DCSync (Mimikatz) | Simulates a Domain Controller via DRSUAPI to pull KRBTGT and NTLM hashes. | Audit root domain ACLs; strip DS-Replication-Get-Changes from all non-DC accounts. |
| NTLM Relay | Interprets unauthenticated SMB/LDAP requests and relays to ADCS/Web Enrollment endpoints. | Enforce LDAP signing + channel binding; disable NTLM via GPO; enable SMB v3 signing. |
3. Incident Response & KRBTGT Password Reset Procedure
If Golden Ticket or DCSync compromise is suspected, the KRBTGT account password must be reset twice with a 10-to-24 hour propagation buffer between resets to revoke all forged Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets without terminating active legitimate sessions.
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